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Mr. Cotis: I found the paper excellent, and I was interested in the
notion that offshoring generates stronger productivity in the industry
where it takes place. An interesting feature of this productivity
channel is that it can be captured from the wage or the employment
side. Trying to infer the magnitude of this productivity effect from
the wage side is obviously very difficult—at least that is what I’m
gathering from this morning’s discussion. 
Looking at the productivity effect from the employment side also
may be useful. This is what we have done at the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the context of
an ongoing project on globalization. We have estimated demand for
labor functions at the industry level, using outward investment in non-
OECD countries as a proxy for offshoring. Cross-country panel data
analyses suggest that, for a given level of output and real wages, the
offshoring variable has a negative impact on labor demand, which
means that labor productivity rises. So, this fits rather well with the
existence of a productivity channel. It seems that offshoring may be
acting like a labor-augmenting technological progress. In a general
equilibrium context, these productivity gains should increase the
output of the industry, with ulterior positive feedback on employment. 
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111Mr. Lazear: One thought I had when I was listening to your pres-
entation was that if I am thinking about the ways by which offshoring
might affect the wages of unskilled workers, I would think about not
taking the skilled distribution as given, but asking how changes in
relative wages will affect the skilled distribution. It seems that might
be one of the more important mechanisms through which this would
work. So, even in the context of your model, you do get different
effects on substitutes and complements within the firms that are
affected most by offshoring. One might expect then that would affect
the investment in skills in human capital. That might be, in fact, an
even larger effect, maybe not in the immediate run, but over a rela-
tively moderate run in terms of raising the wages of the unskilled.
Mr. Leamer: It seems to me that we can think of two broad cate-
gories of economic theories and we have heard both of them this
morning. One is a Heckscher-Ohlin theory in which comparative
advantage is natural. It comes from the unequal distribution of produc-
tive resources—capital, labor, and land—around the globe. 
The other one might be called comparative advantage that is created,
as a consequence of economies of scale and externalities and agglom-
eration forces, etc., which is what the new economic geography is
really all about. The old economic geography is embodied in the
Heckscher-Ohlin natural kinds of geographic inequality of resources. 
When applied economists have to study real problems in a real
dataset, they have to make a choice as to which from this vast set of
theories is it most sensible to use to study a specific problem. If you ask
me to study Mexican and U.S. trade, my instincts are clear that it’s the
Heckscher-Ohlin type of model, having to do with integrating a large
labor force in Mexico with a relatively skilled labor force in the United
States. But if you study Canadian and U.S. trade, then it is the other
type of model, which involves similar countries in terms of resources.
Then you have to understand economies of scale and agglomeration. 
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 I want to emphasize that this task model you have provided us is a
Heckscher-Ohlin-based task model, which is very different from
Venables’ economies of scale. Then you apply it to a north-south
trade between what I think basically is the United States versus
Mexico and China. They are the main exporters to the United States
from the nonindustrialized world. But maybe there are some others
as well. So, you are using a Heckscher-Ohlin model, which I think is
appropriate to study trade between the United States and the nonin-
dustrialized world. 
But task trade is such a small part of that whole enterprise. When
you think about the United States and China, there is not much task
trade. Even in the case of India, there are a lot of antidotes about
reading radiology slides, but the reality is that is such a tiny issue. The
real issue is the mobility of footloose manufacturing seeking out low-
wage workers. I wonder whether this task trade might more
appropriately be applied to the emerging, post-industrial intellectual
service sectors, which are not a north/south phenomenon, but more
trade among equals, intra-industry trade between the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe. 
In addition, I want to point out that your empirical exercise raises
an unhappy choice that doesn’t have to be. This terms-of-trade
improvement you point out generates what you and I would call
Stolper-Samuelson effects. Namely, an improvement in our terms-of-
trade means our exports are more valuable relative to imports, so
resources that are intensively used in the export sector, namely skilled
workers, win. But the unskilled workers lose. That is the story of
Stolper-Samuelson. But Marty Feldstein correctly pointed out this
morning that there are a lot of products coming out of China and
Mexico, which are not made in the United States. Then an improve-
ment in the terms-of-trade wouldn’t let loose the kinds of
Stolper-Samuelson effects that you are talking about. This improve-
ment in the terms of trade is a total win-win situation for everybody
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 in the United States. Nobody loses, as long as we don’t have products
that are directly competing with products that are emanating from
China and Mexico.  
Mr. Trichet: First, I would say that I very much agree with John
Taylor when he says that it is an extraordinarily stimulating paper. I
am not entirely convinced myself with the reasoning on the residual
and the conclusion you are drawing from the residual, but again it is
very stimulating. 
Let me concentrate on one point. When I see concretely, in Europe
in particular, the best success in terms of adaptation to globalization
and offshoring, as you say, I have the example of a country which is
de facto in the euro area, where the unions are frequently supporting
offshoring and are even calling business leaders to offshore. Of course,
the reasoning is the following: They say if you don’t offshore, you will
be bankrupt and all the jobs will be lost. The rationale of the trade
unions is that, in so doing, they are protecting the jobs of the reason-
ably skilled worker. I understand also, when discussing with them and
with the executive branch, that there is a consensus on the crucial
assumption, which is exactly what Marty Feldstein said earlier this
morning—namely a lot of the unskilled workers will be able to go in
a growing, nontradeable service sector, which is the key.
What strikes me is that one of the explanations for your residual
might be that the prices of the services that are rendered in the
nontradeable service sector—the kind of labor that you are supplying
physically to households in particular—should not be necessarily
touched by globalization. Perhaps there is a link between the wages
and salaries of this kind of unskilled work, which—while being
unskilled—substitutes nevertheless to the average skilled laborers of
households in general when they are dealing with their own child
care, housekeeping, etc. There is a paradox in some economies in
Europe (I don’t know whether it is the case in the United States): You
have unskilled workers in manufacturing who are in a very difficult
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 situation, obviously, as long as they don’t move, and simultaneously
you have also unskilled labor that is strongly demanded, where the
wages and salaries are way up in all these nontradeable services that
are rendered to households for child care, senior care, housekeeping,
small household chores of all kinds, and so forth. There again,
perhaps we have one of the possible explanations for the successes
observed in some economies in Europe, which are engineering a large
shift of unskilled workers from one sector to the other.
Ms. Scobie: My comment concerns not just the last paper but also
all the papers of this session. It seems that the focus and the empha-
sis of the papers so far have been on the supply side. The missing
variable from the arguments is, however, the role and the reaction of
the consumer to a) the changing economic geography of the world
and b) to offshoring, in particular within the service sector, that is,
within industries such as banking, insurance, airlines, etc. Somehow,
the consumer is left out of the arguments in a significant way, and the
dynamics of the consumers’ satisfaction has to be considered. The
offshoring that has occurred globally, especially in the service sector,
has led to the consumer quietly suffering. In short, there has been a
global impotency on the part of the consumer. If the recipient of an
offshored service is unhappy with that service, firms pay no attention
as to how unsatisfied the consumers may be. For, today, all large firms
engage in offshoring.
Maybe an example in the United Kingdom can demonstrate the
point. Most service sectors in the United Kingdom are offshoring
to India at present. Whenever one wants to make any phone calls
to these institutions, one has to undergo a huge number of security
questions, at the end of which the caller’s question still remains
unanswered. A customer of a major bank in the United Kingdom
called his bank which had offshored to India, trying to make an
inquiry. After a dozen security questions, the bank staff said,
“What is your question?” The customer answered, “I’ve left my
spectacles at the bank and was wondering if you have found them?” 
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 Perhaps the authors of these papers also could reflect upon and
address the issue of the dynamics of consumer dissatisfaction and
of how the consumer’s ultimate response might impact the future
of offshoring.
Mr. Grossman: Thank you all for your comments. Let me start by
saying that John mentioned that his examples were couched in terms of
occupations rather than tasks, which gives me a nice lead-in to mention
some research we discussed in the paper that I didn’t have time to cover
in my remarks, namely the work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane. These
authors have taken the occupations performed in the United States and
have tried to identify the types of tasks performed in each. 
Workers in some 10,000 or 15,000 occupations have been surveyed
and asked a number of questions about what is involved in doing
their jobs. Autor, Levy, and Murnane converted the distribution of
occupations of American workers into a distribution of the types of
tasks that are being performed in the United States. They grouped
tasks into five categories, depending upon whether the work was
manual or cognitive and whether it was “routine” or “nonroutine.”  
We have taken their numbers and have aggregated them further. It
seemed to us that what is most important for offshoring is the distinc-
tion between routine and nonroutine tasks. This is not an original
idea to us, but it is common in recent writings about offshoring. It is
interesting to note that, in fact, in the data, you find a large and
ongoing increase in the performance of nonroutine tasks in the U.S.
economy and a steady decline in the performance of routine tasks,
which is consistent with the kind of story in our paper.  
John emphasized that it is important in our framework there be
inframarginal tasks, and I agree. Indeed, it is critical to our argument.
We think that this is a strength of our modeling because, contrary to
the example he gave of the scanner, the IT revolution has essentially
been a broad-based change in technology. Digitization is a “general-
purpose technology” that is changing our ability to perform entire
ranges of tasks. The events of the IT revolution are captured well, I
think, as a downward movement in the schedule of offshoring costs. 
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 An interesting implication of there having to be inframarginal tasks
to get the benefits we talk about is that when the process of offshoring
just gets going, there is little offshoring taking place, so there is going
to be only a small productivity effect. Initially, when we are very high
on John’s list of tasks, there is going to be very little productivity gain
as the technology for offshoring improves. But this is a process, accord-
ing to our model, that could pick up steam, where the productivity
gains grow larger as the amount of offshoring does so, at least so long
as there continues to be tasks that must be performed at home. 
Finally, on John’s point, and those made by some others, concern-
ing our interpretation of the residual and the boldness of drawing
conclusions from residuals, we are well-aware of this issue. I would
say, as a side comment, that Robert Solow got pretty far by following
that route, but we are no Robert Solow. The problem we face is the
lack of any direct measures of offshoring. We would need such meas-
ures in order to perform a more direct analysis that relates offshoring
to variables of interest.
As Jean-Philippe Cotis mentioned, one could possibly use proxies, as
I understand what the OECD has done. Perhaps that is what future
work should do. But at this point, without good measures of
offshoring, the best we can do is to look for smoking guns. That is all
we really mean the residual to be. It is a hint that there has been some
labor-biased technological progress in the United States in the last few
years. We really don’t have any way, at this point, to disentangle what
has given rise to the biased technological progress.
Eddie Lazear pointed out that a longer-run effect of changes in rela-
tive wages will be changes in the skill distribution. I completely agree
with his point. I thought I was also going to agree with Ed Leamer,
until he veered off at the very end. I certainly agree that our paper is
about north/south issues. Our paper does not help us think about why
some tasks are performed in Canada and others in the United States, in
the process of integration between these two countries. The factor-price
differences between Canada and the United States just aren’t large
enough, and the whole motivation for the offshoring that we are
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 talking about here is to take advantage of lower foreign factor prices.
We are indeed thinking about north/south relations in our analysis. 
Where I disagree with Ed is when he says, “Well, in U.S.-China rela-
tions, there isn’t much task trade.” We think to the contrary that we see
enormous amount of task trade between the United States and China.
We see China manufacturing T-shirts that are being designed and
marketed in the United States. We see employment growth at Wal-
Mart to sell the T-shirts that are sewn in China. If one takes a broader
view of the goods that are being delivered to consumers and all the tasks
that go into making and selling them, they embody many tasks requir-
ing both skilled and unskilled labor that are not easily tradable. For the
process of manufacturing the good, yes, the cloth is shipped over to
China with explicit instructions of how it is to be sewn together and
redelivered back to the U.S. market. But when the entire design,
production, and marketing process is taken as a whole, we actually see
the China example as one that fits well within our framework. 
This observation also bears on the point that Ed Leamer made with
reference to Marty Feldstein. We prefer not to think about specializa-
tion in “goods,” but rather the tasks that go into making them. It is
misleading to think about a good as no longer being produced in the
United States because even those goods that are not manufactured
here may embody significant amounts of U.S. value added. We think
that much of the value in T-shirts does still emanate from the United
States. The manufacturing of the T-shirt, of course, is not taking place
in the United States, but a substantial part of the cost of the T-shirt
cost is still being paid to U.S. factors of production, for the use of
U.S. technology, designs, marketing, and the like. So, considering the
entire integrated process of producing a T-shirt and delivering it to
the consumer and convincing him of its beauty, a large part of that
industry still resides in the United States. This, to our mind, is task
trade between the United States and China.
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